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WHY DON'T THE ELDERLY LIVE WITH THEIR CHILDREN?
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ABSTRACT
Perhaps no single statistic raises more concern about post War changes
in the U.S. family than the proportion of the elderly living alone. Since
1940 the proportion of elderly living slone and in institutions has risen
dramatically. While demographics appear to explain much of the change in the
living arrangements of the elderly, the rising income of the elderly is
viewed by many as the chief or at least a chief reason why the elderly live
alone. The analyses underlying this view have not, however, considered
the incomes and preferences of the children of the elderly. This paper
presenta a model of the joint living arrangement choice of parents and
children. It then uses a new set of data to conaider how the preferences
and income positions of the elderly and their children influence the living
arrangements of elderly parents. The findings suggest that the preferences
and income levels of children may be important factors in explaining why
so many of the elderly live alone.
Laurence J. Kotlikoff John Morris
NBER Hebrew Rehabilitation Center
1050 Maaaachuaetta Avenue for the Aged
Cambridge, MA 02138 12 Center Street
Roalindale, MA 02131—3—
Perhaps no single statistic raises more concern about post War changes in
the U.S. family than the proportion of the elderly living alone. Since 1940
the proportion of unmarried noninstitutionalized elderly living alone has
risen from less than 25 percent to over 60 percent. For the old old, those
over 85, the proportion has increased from 13 percent to 57 percent (Sandefur
and Tuma, 1987). The proportion of the old old living in institutions has
also increased dramatically; in 1940 only 7 percent of those over 85 lived in
institutions; today's figure is almost 25 percent. Part of the reason the
current elderly are much less likely to live with children is simply that they
had relatively few children and that they have outlived some or all of their
children. In 1940 for each person age 80 and over there were four people age
60 to 65; in 1985 for each person age 80 and over there were fewer than two
people age 60 to 65. And when the baby boomers are in their 80s there will be
only one person age 60 to 65 for each baby boomer (Current Population Reports,
1984)
While demographics appear to explain much of the change in the living
arrangements of the elderly, the rising income of the elderly is viewed by
many as the chief or at least a chief reason why the elderly live alone. This
argument has been made by Beresford and Rivlin (1966), Davis and van der Oever
(1981), Carliner (1975), Chevan and Korson (1972), Kobrin (1976a, 1976b),
Soldo and Lauriat (1976), Michael, Fuchs, and Scott (1980), Tissue and McCoy
(1981), and Wolf(1984). One difficulty in interpreting these studies is that
they fail to control for characteristics of children. Since incomes of
parents and children are correlated, the measured effects of parents' income
on living arrangements may be capturing, at least in part, the influence of
children's incomes. In contrast to the standard view, it may be that
increases in children's incomes have lowered the likelihood of shared living.-4-
The fact that more than half the aged living with their children are
themaelvea the homeownera (Schorr, 1980) auggests that many adult children
live with their elderly parenta for financial reasons.
This study uses new data on the characteristics of the elderly and their
children to study the effects of children's and parents' income as well as
other characteristics on the shared living decision. The new data are the
1986 HRCA Survey of the Elderly and the 1986 NBER—HRCA Child Survey. The 1986
HRCA Survey of the Elderly is part of an ongoing panel survey of the Elderly
in Massachusetts that is being conducted by The Hebrew Rehabilitation Center
for the Aged (HRCA). The 1986 NBER—HRCA Child Survey is sn interview of the
children of those elderly who participated in the 1986 HRCA Survey of the
Elderly.
The research reported here considers 297 cases of elderly parents who
have a single living child. Our first approach to studying the living
arrangements of these 297 parent—child observations is to estimate reduced
form logit and probit models. Estimates of these models indicate that child
characteristics such as income and marital status are as important as parent
characteristics in explaining living arrangements. The probit and logit
results point to the principal determinants of shared living, but
understanding the precise role of income and other variables in this decision
requires a structural model. Our second approach is thus to develop and
estimate a structural model of shared living. The model trades off the
economies to scale in shared living against the (potential) disutility of
parents and children from living together. Analysis of the model indicates
that, regardless of the precise form of preferences, the decision concerning
shared living is economically separate from the decision concerning how much
housing the parent and children should purchase and how much the parent and—5—
child should each consume; i.e., living arrangements can be atudied without
simultaneously specifying the precise nature of parent—child bargaining. The
model also clarifies how the parent's and child's income jointly affect the
shared living decision. In contrast to the logit or probit specifications, in
the structural model the effects of increases in income of either the parent
or child depend on the parent's and child's preferences toward living
together. By introducing error terms in the model, these preferences can be
estimated. The error terms in the model are specified quite naturally as
unobserved (to the econometrican) taste parameters concerning shared living.
The paper proceeds in Section II with a presentation of the structural
model and an analysis of how changes in parent and child incomes affect the
decision to live together. Section III demonstrates how the model can be
empirically estimated. Section IV describes the URCA and NBER—HRCA surveys,
summarizes some general findings from the twonewsurveys, and presents cross
tabulations from our sample of 297 parents and their single children. Section
V presents probit and logit models of the choice of the elderly to live with
children, to live in sn institution, or to live alone. Section VI reports and
interprets maximum likelihood estimates of the structural model. Finally,
Section VII summarizes and concludes the paper.
II.A. A Model of Femilv Living Arransements
Consider a single surviving parent who has only one child. Let and
stand, respectively, for parent and child preferences over goods, housing
services, and living arrangements. If the parent and child live alone, the
parent maximizes U, and the child maximizes jjc. When they choose to live
together, they are assumed to maximize UF (given in (1)), which is a weighted—6—
average of their preferences, where the weight 8 that is chosen by the parent
and child reflects the outcome of parent—child bargaining.
(1) UF_9tJp+(l_O)Uc
This is a general expression for family preferences in the case of shared
living since 8 can take any value between zero and unity. Formulating the
problem in this manner only restricts the solution to be efficient; i.e. ,the
maximization of UF subject to the collective family (parent and child) budget
produces a Pareto efficient solution, and all Pareto efficient solutions to
the shared living choice problem can be represented as the maximand of UF for
a particular choice of the utility weight 8.
Consider the following Cobb—Douglas characterization of U and
(2) Up —Alog (CH)
U —Blog (C H ) c cc
In (2), C and Cc are the respective levels of consumption of the parent
and child, while H and Hc are the respective housing services enjoyed by the
parent and child. The coefficients A and B describe the parent's and child's
preferences for shared living. If the parent and child live apart, A and B
both equal unity; if they live together, A or B can be greater than, equal to,
or less than unity depending on whether the parent or child enjoy living
together, are indifferent to shared housing, or prefer living apart. We are
particularly interested in cases in which A >1and B <1or vice versa; i.e.,
when one family member prefers living together and the other prefers living
apart.—7—
We first consider the maximization of (1) for given values of 9 and then
examine the choice of 9 as well as the conditions under which the parent and
child choose to live together. When the parent and child live together their
combined budget is:
(3) Cp+C+HYp+Y
In (3), q stands for the relative price of housing services; and and
are the incomes of the parent and child, respectively. H stands for the
quantity of housing services jointly consumed by the parent and child; i.e.,
equation (3) incorporates the assumption that housing services are a public
good that can be simultaneously consumed by both the parent and child without
congestion. While one could assume some marginal congestion from shared
housing, which could be modeled as a higher effective price of H, as long as
the effective price of H is less than 2q there is an economic incentive for
shared housing. In this study we assume zero marginal congestion.
The economic gain from shared housing, which is modeled here as a lower
effective price of housing, is compared with the disutility from shared
housing (in which case A and/or B will be less than unity) in determining
whether the parent and child will live together. More precisely, the parent
and child each compare their utility when they live together with their
utility if they live alone. The necessary condition for shared living is that
both the parent and child be at least as well off living together as they
would be if they lived apart.
Figure 1 illustrates the parent—child utility possibility frontier from
shared living. The point Q lies outside the frontier. If the utilities of
the parent and child from living apart are given by point Q, the two will—8—
choose to live apart. If, on the other hand, separate living produced utility
levels indicated by point R, the parent and child can do better by living
together. The assumption that when they live together the child and parent
choose efficient and mutually advantageous levels of housing and consumption
means that the utility outcome lies on the frontier between and including
points and Rc. At one extreme, point the parent receives all the gains
from shared housing, while at the other extreme Rc, all gains go to the child
and the parent is no better off than if he or she lived alone. Points on the
frontier between K1, and Rc involve both the parent and child sharing the gains
from living together. The choice of the weight 8 used in maximizing (1)
subject to (3) determines the point chosen on the utility possibility
frontier.
While the exact point chosen on the frontier requires an explicit
specification of the child—parent bargaining process, the decision to live
together can be examined without any reference to the specific bargaining
solution. Given the assumption that efficient bargaining occurs, one can
decide whether or not the parent and child live together simply by determining
whether their utility position if they live apart lies inside or outside the
utility possibility frontier available if they live together. This is a
general proposition that holds regardless of the precise form of preferences.
In terms of equations (I) and (3), one need only show that there is a range of
values of 8 that, when used in (1), imply a Pareto improvement over living
apart. Knowledge of the particular value of 8 actually chosen is not
required. The fact that one can study living arrangements independently from
studying nonaltruistic parent—child decision making (bargaining) is a great
advantage since estimating this process would place greater demands on the
data.—9—
A simple procedure for determining whether the utility position from
living apart lies inside or outside of the frontier involves calculating two
criticalvalues of e, and0c O is the value of 9 which if used in
maximizing (1) subject to (3) leaves the parent with the same utility from
shared living as he or she receives from living alone; 9c is defined
symmetrically for the child. If — theutility position from living
apart lies on the utility frontier available if they live together. If
> Ox,. then the utility position from living apart lies inside the frontier.
If > the utility position from living apart lies outside the frontier.
To see this, note that if O > 8c' the choice of 0 8 produces a lower level
of utility for the child than he or she enjoys from living alone, while
choosing 8 < 9 produces a lower level of utility for the parent than is
available from living alone.
The conditions under which —areof interest because they indicate
the circumstances in which the parent and child would be just indifferent
between living together and living apart. As demonstrated below, given Y,
and q, the condition 9 —O(the utility position from living apart is on
the frontier) occurs for combinations of the utility parameters A and B
defined by a function G(A,B) —0.Hence, the conditions under which the
parent and child choose to live together can be expressed in terms of critical
values of the preferences (A and B) of the parent and child toward shared
living. While the preference parameters A and B are not observed, their
determinants can be estimated.
Maximization of (1) subject to (3) yields the following demand relations
when the parent and child live together:—10—




Note that the demand for housing services, in this formulation, is independent
of the bargaining solution, 9. Larger values of 8, the weight applied to the
parent's preferences, means more parent consumption (larger C) and less
consumption of the child (smaller Ce). Without loss of generality we measure
H in units such that q —1/4.
The indirect utility functions of the parent, Vi,, and child, Vc, from
shared living are given by:
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From (7) one can show that S9/6A <0and 6(1—9)/SB < 0; the smaller the
parent's disutility from shared living, the smaller is the critical weight 9
that leaves the parent indifferent between living apart and living together.
The critical child weight, (1 —9c'is correspondingly negatively related to
the child's utility from shared living.
Equating 9 and 9c provides the relation G(A,B) —0given in (8). Values
of A and B satisfying G(A,B) —0leave the parent and the child indifferent
between living together and living apart. If C(A,B) >0,the parent and child
choose to live togethr. They choose to live apart if C(A,B) < 0. Note that
the asymptotes of the G( )functionoccur at A —2logY/1og(Y2—l)
and B —
2logY/1og(Y2—l).When Y, becomes very large relative to c' approaches 1,
and B approaches 1 when Yc becomes very large relative to Y,.
(8) C(A,B) -2-2/B-2/A-0
Along the locus defined by G(A,B) —0we have:




Figure 2 graphs the values of A and B satisfying (8). The point D
defined by A —1,B —1lies above the G(A,B) —0locus and involves shared—12—
living. To see this one need only observe from (7) that when A —1and B —1,
8/ _Y2/(Y2 +2YY)<l.
which is the condition for shared living.
Combinations of A and B lying northeast of the G(A,B) —0locus satisfy G(A,B)
> 0 and entail shared living, while combinations lying southwest of the locus
satisfy G(A,B) <0and entail separate living. Consider points in which the
parent prefers to live together (A >I)and the child prefers to live alone (B
<1).As rises relative to the G(A,B) curve approaches a verticle line
at A—I leaving all such points in the area for which G(A,B) > 0. Hence, when
parents prefer living together, but their children do not, they are able
eventually to bride their children if their incomes are sufficiently high
relative to their children. The opposite situation in which the child's
preferences always dominate arises when c is very very large relative to
II.B. Income Effects and Living Arranements
The G(A,B) function can be used to analyze the impact of increases in the
parent's or child's income on the decision to live together. The technique is
to consider how income changes shift the G(A,B) —0locus. The G*(A,B) —0
and G**(A,B) —0loci in Figure 3 are examples of such shifts. Given a
distribution of family pairs of A and B in the population, the G*( )locus
clearly involves less shared living than the G( )locussince all A,B pairs
lying between the two curves now involve living apart.
The G**(A,B) —0locus, on the other hand, involves less living together
among families in which both the child and parent dislike shared living
(A < 1), but possibly more shared living in cases in which either the parent
or the child prefers living together (A >1or B > 1).
To examine shifts in the G(A,B) locus we consider the implicit function A
—
F(BYpYc)defined by C(A,B) —0and determine how this function changes—13—
with changes in and '.holdingB constant. For example, if changes in the
function F( )arisingfrom a particular income change are positive at each
level of B, the G(A,B) curve shifts outward. We first consider the impact of
a uniform proportional increase in Y, and Let A represent a positive
factor multiplying Y and c• Equation (10) presents the derivative SA/SA —
8F(BAY.AY)/6A
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This derivative is clearly positive for A < 1 and B < 1. Hence, equal
proportional increases in Y and c reduces shared living among families in
which both the parent and child dislike living together (A <1and
B < 1). On the other hand, among families where there is disagreement about
shared living (A > 1 and B < 1 or B > 1 and A < 1), such income increases may
or may not increase shared living.
We next consider how redistribution from the child to theparentshifts
the C(A,B) —0locus. This derivative, which holds Y constant and raises






This derivative is negative if A > B and Y < c• Hence, among families in
which the parent is relatively poor and has a relative preference for living—14—
with the child, redistribution from the child to the parent increases the
extent of shared living. In terms of Figure 2, such redistribution leads to a
counterclockwise rotation of the C(A,E) —0locus.
Finally, we consider changes in the C(A,B) —0locus arising from changes
in the income of one family member, holding constant the income of the other
member. Equation (12) examines the effect of raising Y:
—2Y+2
tl1\ dA A p
'/ dY 1 2/A 2
p -jY logY
This derivative is negative for values of A ￿1and is positive for
sufficiently small values of A. Hence, a rise in the income of the parent
produces a counterclockwise rotation in the G(A,B) —0locus, thereby raising
the frequency of shared living among familiea whose parents prefer living with
their children (A >1)and reducing the frequency of shared living among
families whose parents prefer to live apart (A <1)).Increases in the
child's income, holding the parent's income constant, produce a clockwise
rotation in the C(A,B) —0curve, giving more weight to child's preferences in
determining living arrangements.
To summarize, in the structural model the effects of income changes on
living arrangements depend in a nonlinear manner on the relative incomes of
parents and children and on both of their preferences. This feature differs
greatly from the implicit assumption in logit and probit specifications that
the effects of income changes are the same sign regardless of the particular
parent—child observation in question.—15—
III. Empirical Specification
Preferences towards living arrangements are likely to differ greatly
across as well as within families. Hence, it seems reasonable to model the
preference parameters A and B as depending partly on observable
characteristics and partly on unobservable (at least to the econometrician)
components. Specifically, we assume that A and B can be represented as:
(13) A_apXp+Pp
B—acXc+
In(13) and X are vectors of characteristics determining the parent's and
child's preferences, respectively.
The terms and in (13) are random errors, which, to simplify the
exposition, are assumed here to be independent standard normal deviates.
Referring to Figure 2, the likelihood that a parent and child live apart
corresponds to the probability that G(A,B) is negative, which is given by:
(14) P(G(A,B) <0)_J"P(A_A*)P(G(A ,B) <0)dA*
From Figure 2, for values of A below the horizontal asymptote A, G(A,B) is







In(15) F( )standsfor the standard normal distribution function, and f(
standsfor the standard normal density function. The probability of living—16—
together is simply 1 —P(C(A,B)S 0). These expressions can be used to form
the likelihood of observing a sample of parents some of whom live with their
children and some of whom do not. Hence, the parameter vectors and 0c can
be estimated by maximum likelihood. Note that this probability statement is
quite different from the standard reduced form logit specification that one
might posit. For example, parent's income enters in a complex, nonlinear
fashion in the probability statement, and its influence on the probability of
shared living interacts with the level of the child's income and the parent's
and child's preferences for shared living.
IV.A. The Data
As mentioned, this paper uses data from the 1986 HRCA Survey of the
Elderly and the 1986 NEER—URCA Child Survey. The former survey was conducted
by the Hebrew Rehabilitation Center for the Aged (HRCA), while the latter was
conducted by the authors and HRCA. The 1986 HRCA Survey of the Elderly is
part of an ongoing panel survey of Massachusetts elderly which began in 1982.
In addition to the 1982 and 1986 surveys, the elderly sample was reinterviewed
in 1984, 1985, and 1987. The 1986 NBER—HRCA Child Survey is a survey of the
children of those elderly interviewed in the 1986 HRCA Survey of the Elderly.
One child of each elderly respondent was interviewed and asked a set of
questions concerning his (her) household, his (her) parents, and his (her)
siblings.
The original 1982 stratified sample of 3856 elderly individuals was drawn
from two populations. The first population (the community sample), accounting
for 2674 of the elderly in the total sample, was drawn from communities in
Massachusetts. The second population (the health care sample), which accounts
for the remaining 1182 elderly in the 1982 survey, was drawn from elderly—17—
participants of all 27 Massachusetts home health care corporations. 6oth
samples were stratified to produce an over representation of the older old.
The sample's selection is described in more detail in Kotlikoff and Morris
(1987) and Morris et. al. (1987). The 1982 sampleofthe elderly included
only the non—institutionalized elderly, but each subsequent survey has
followed the initial sample as they changed residences, including moving into
and out from nursing homes.
Each of the HRCASurveysof the Elderly include detailed questions about
living arrangements and health status. The 1986 reinterview of the elderly
also contains a series of questions of the elderly about their children.
These questions include the names, sexes, and locations of all children,
frequency of contact and the typeofcontact with children, and the extent of
financial aid given to and received from children, and the amountof
assistance given by children to their elderly parents in performing activities
of daily living. In addition, the 1986 Survey contains a set of questions
about the elderly respondent's income and wealth.
At the close of the HRCAelderlysurvey we asked elderly respondents in
the community sampleforpermission to Contact one of his/her children to
conduct our child survey. Whilewewould have preferred to randomly select
the child to be interviewed, we felt we would receive more cooperation if we
allowed the parent to make the selection. Like the HRCA Surveys of the
Elderly, The NBER—HRCAChild Surveyis a telephone interview. The Child
Surveyis roughly 45 minutes in length. Interviews with the child's spouse
were conducted if the child was unavailable. The questions in the Child
Survey concerning the respondent's characteristics include age, geographic
location, marital status, number of young children, work and health status,
occupation, industry, education, grades in high school, income, and wealth.-18-
These questions are also asked of the respondent about his or her siblings.
In addition, the child was asked to indicate (I) the frequency of contact
between each sibling and each sibling's spouse and the NRC elderly respondent
parent, (2) the amount of financial assistance each sibling and his spouse
give to or receive from the NRC elderly respondent parent, and (3) the amount
of time each sibling and his spouse spends helping the NRC elderly respondent.
The child is also asked about his parents' health status as well as his
parents' income and net wealth.
The sample size of the initial 1982 Survey of the Elderly is 3856. In
contrast, the 1986 completed sample size of elderly was 2889, with most of the
attrition since 1982 due to deaths. In the 1986 data over 90 percent of the
elderly are above age 70, over 40 percent are the old old (above age 85), and
over two thirds are females. The size of the NBER-HRCA Child Survey is 850.
Of these 850 children, 341 have no living siblings. In this study we consider
these 341 children with no siblings and their elderly parents who were also
interviewed in 1986. Of the 341 single child\parent observations, 297 have
complete data. The remaining 45 observations are missing data, typically on
the income of either the child, the elderly parent(s), or both.
IV.8. Some Initial Findings from the 1986 NRC Survey of the Elderly and the
NBER-HRCA Child Survey
Since the 297 observations examined here represent only a portion of the
data, it may be useful to summarize some of the initial findings reported in
Kotlikoff and Morris (1987) based on the entire 1986 Elderly and Child
Surveys. These data paint a bimodal picture of contact and assistance of the
elderly by their children, with a majority of elderly receiving significant
attention and care and a significant minority receiving little or no attentioi—19—
or care. Clearly, the realities of demographics limit the potential support
that children can provide parents. Over a fifth of the HRCA elderly in 1986
had no children, and another fifth have only one child. Elderly couples are
more likely to have children than the single elderly; over a quarter of the
single elderly have no children. Daughters are often viewed as more important
providers of care to the elderly than sons. But in total, 40.5 percent of the
elderly have either no daughters or just one daughter. And over one half of
the elderly either have no daughters or have no daughters who live within an
hour.
Only 13.1 percent of all elderly and only 15.4 percent of vulnerable
elderly live with their children. Of those elderly with children, fewer than
one fifth live with their children. Indeed, over half of single elderly males
and females and over 40 percent of single elderly males and females who were
deemed vulnerable based on an ADL ability score live completely alone. The
fraction of respondents in institutions in 1986 is 11.8 percent for the entire
sample and over 25 percent for the vulnerable elderly. Taken together these
figures suggest only modest support of the elderly by children in the form of
shared living quarters.
The geographic location of parents obviously limits their access to their
children. Over one third of the elderly either have no children or have no
children who live within an hour. Despite their health problems, the
vulnerable elderly are only slightly more likely to live with or near their
children. Of those elderly who have children, but are not living with them,
only 44.6 percent have more than one child within an hour. In a typical month
over a quarter of children of the elderly do not physically spend time with
their children; in contrast, almost a quarter of children, including thoae—20—
living with the HRCA elderly, spent over 30 hours in the previous month in
physical contact.
While physical contact may, in some instances, be limited, most elderly
with children have some form of contact, be it telephone contact or visits,
during the week. Of the elderly with children, 84 percent either live with
their children or have daily or weekly contact with one or more children.
The institutionalized, the group with perhaps the greatest need for child
contact, sometimes receive the least attention. Almost one third of the
institutionalized elderly either have no children or have very little contact
with their children over the course of a year. For the noninstitutionalized
the corresponding fraction is less than one quarter.
Although many of the elderly in the HRCA sample are quite poor, direct
financial support of elderly parents by children is rare. Only 3 percent of
the HRCA elderly report receiving regular monthly financial help from their
children. Of the elderly that are very poor (annual incomes below $5000), the
corresponding percentage is only 4 percent. These figures seem surprising;
and what is even more surprising is that there are few transfers to the poor
elderly even in cases where there are a large number of middle and upper
income children.
IV. C. Characteristics of the Selected Samule —TheElderly
There are 297 elderly respondents in the 1986 HRCA Survey of the Elderly
corresponding to the 297 children. Ten percent of these respondents live in
nursing homes, 20 percent live with their children, and the rest, 70 percent,
live alone, which in this context meana either completely alone, with their
spouse, or with other individuals who are not their children. The 297 elderly
reapondenta are typically quite old; over half, 150, are age 85 and over. For—21—
those sge 85 and older the proportion living in nursing homes is 16 percent,
the proportion living with children is 23 percent, and the proportion living
alone is 61 percent. Two thirds of the elderly are females; interestingly,
only I of the 30 institutionalized elderly is a male. The elderly sample is
disproportionately white (94 percent), and single (72 percent).
We have created five dummy variables to characterize the elderly
respondents' health status. These are Independent (Hl), Minor Functional
Problems (112), Requires Assistance with Independent Activities of Daily Living
(113), Requires Some Assistance with Activities of Daily Living (H4), and
Requires Substantial Assistance with Activities of Daily Living (H5). Each of
the elderly was allocated to one of these categories based on responses to
over 30 questions on functional ability, ability to perform independent
activities of daily living, and objective information about ongoing diseases
and infirmities. We also considered several other health variables including
dummies for neurological problems, inability to move from a chair without
assistance, and Alzheimer'a disease. These variables did not add
significantly to the prediction of living arrangements given the dummies 111 —
115.Of the 30 institutionalized elderly, 28 have positive 114 or 115 health
indicators. Of the 58 elderly living with their children, 12 (21 percent)
have positive 114 or 115 indicators; and of the 209 elderly living alone, 21 (10
percent) have positive 114 or 115 indicators.
The incomes of the elderly are typically fairly low. Slightly over half
of the elderly reported income below $7500. Another 39 percent reported
incomes between $7500 and $20000. Only 23 of the elderly, 8 percent, report
incomes over $20,000. It is interesting to note that none of these 23 higher
income elderly live in nursing homes, and only 2 of the 23 live with their
children.—22—
IV. C. Characteristics of the Selected Samnle —TheChildren
The ages of the 297 children of the elderly range from 27 to 79. A
surprisingly high number, 185, of the 297 children are female. Slightly over
half are younger than 55; over two thirds are between ages 45 and 65.
Children living with their parents tend to be somewhat older; 19 percent of
children living with parents are age 65 or older, compared to 8 percent for
children whose parents live alone. Most of the children, 76 percent, are
married; but among children living with their parents, the proportion married
is only 45 percent. Over half of the children went to college, and only 30 of
the 297 children failed to complete high school. There is no clear
correlation in the raw data between child's education and the living
arrangements of the parents.
In contrast to the parents, whose median income is approximately $7000,
the median income of children is approximately $30,000. A total of 61
children reported incomes above $50,000, and 21 reported incomes below
$10,000. Of the 61 elderly whose children have incomes above $50,000, 53, 87
percent, live alone. This figure contrasts with the 70 percent figure for the
overall sample. Most of the children, 85 percent, report their health to be
good, 14 percent report their health to be fair, and only 1 percent report
their health to be poor.
Section V. Loait and Probit Estimates
Table 1 reports results for a logit model specifying the probability of
living alone, living in an institution, and living with children. The
independent variables are: the age of the parent, Age; the sex of the parent,
Male—l for a male, 0 otherwise; the marital status of the parent, Marry—l for—23—
married, 0 otherwise; the income of the parent, Income; four health dummies
for the parent, Hl, H2, H3, and H4; the age of the child, KAge; the marital
atatus of the child, Kmarry—l married, 0 otherwise; the sex of the child,
Kmale—l for a male, 0 otherwise; the income of the child, Klncome; the years
of education of the child, KEduc; and the self reported health status of the
child, KHealch—l if the child reported excellent or good health, 0 otherwise.
Surprisingly few of the parent coefficients from the logit model are
significant, but the signs of the coefficients of parent variables generally
accord with previous findings. In particular, higher levels of parent's
income increase the probability of living alone, as does being married, and
being male. Compared to those elderly with severe health problems (those in
the fifth health category), other elderly are more likely to live alone and
are less likely to live in a nursing home.
The new child variables in the logit indicate that those elderly whose
children have higher incomes, are married, or ere male are more likely to live
alone or live in an institution. Both KMsrry variables are significant, and
the KMale coefficient in determining the probability of living alone. The
Klncome variable in the probability of living alone is almost significant.
The probit model presented in Table 2 considers the subsample of 267
elderly who are not in nursing homes. As in the logit results, Table 2
indicates that the probability of living with children rather than living
alone decreases with the parent's and child's income. This probability is
smaller if the child is male or if the child or parent are married.
Surprisingly, the parent health variables are not significant, although they
have the expected sign. The child health coeffitient is also insignificant;
according to the Table parents whose children are in excellent or good health
are more likely to live with their children. While neither the age of the—24—
parent nor the child is significant, older parents are more likely to live
with their children as are parents with older children. Finally, parents
with more educated children are less likely to live with their children,
although this coefficient is also insignificant. In sum, the logit and
probit coefficients, although often insignificant, generally accord with our
priors and suggest that child characteristics are important co—determinants
of the living arrangements of the elderly.
Section VI. Results from Estimating the Structural Model
The estimated coefficients from the structural model based on the 267
observations of children and their noninstitutionalized parents are
presented in Table 3. A likelihood ratio test indicates that, as a group,
the coefficients are highly significant. The variable Health is a dummy
that takes on the value 1 if the parent's health indicator is H4 or H5, and
zero otherwise. The first five coefficients in the Table multiplied by
their respective variables correspond to the term aX in (13), while the
second five coefficients multiplied by their respective variables correspond
to the term acXc in (13). Hence, positive coefficients in the Table mean
that either the expected value of A or B is larger, as is the probability of
shared living. According to the Table, this probability is smaller for
married parents or parents with married children. It is also smaller if the
child is male. In contrast, the probability of shared living is larger for
male parents, older parents, parents with older children, parents with less
well educated children, and parents who fall into the worst two health
categories.
The estimated coefficients from the structural model can be used to
determine values of and mcXc for each observation. The mean values of—25—
a9X9 and ccxc acroas all observations are .848 and .482, respectively.
Since both theae figurea are leas than unity, both children and parents
prefer, on average, to live apart, but children have a stronger preference
toward separate living. Not all parents and children have values of
and OcXc less than unity. Quite the contrary; 129 of the 267 parents (48
percent) and 64 children (24 percent) have estimated values of a9X and
OcXc, respectively, in excess of unity. Hence, almost half of parents and
almost one quarter of children appear to prefer shared living. Figure 4
presents the distribution of pairs of cX and ccxc for each parent—child
pair. Points in the southeast and northwest quadrants indicate parent—child
pairs in which there is a conflict with respect to preferences toward shared
living. Points in the northwest quadrant correspond to cases in which
parents prefer to live with their children (assuming —°)andchildren
prefer to live apart from their parents (assuming c0 Points in the
southeast quadrant correspond to parents who prefer to live apart from their
children, but children who prefer to live with their parents. Since 129 of
the 267 parents want (sssuming ss-'O) to live with their children, but only
58 do so, it appears that a large number of parents live alone against their
will. According to the model, if their incomes were sufficiently high,
these parents could persuade their children to live with them.
Another issue that can be explored using the model's estimated
coefficients is the effect on the probability of living together of changes
in income. In this exercise, reported in Table 4, we evaluate x9 end ccxc
at the mean values of 5 and xc and consider different combinations of Y
and '1cC The Table indicates that, at the mean values of mp5 and ccxc,
significant changes in the probability of living together occur only if the
child's or parent's income are fairly low. Stated differently, because the—26--
mean preferences indicate a mutual dislike for shared living, the income of
the parent or the child must be quite low to produce a reasonably large
probability of shared living.
A related experiment is to ask how equalizing the incomes of children
and parents, while keeping the total constant, affects the probability of
living together. To analyze this question, we used the estimated values of
mX and mcXc for each parent and child and computed the probability of
shared living given current income positions. We then computed the
probability based on equalized income. The differences in probabilities for
the 267 observations are quite small. For 173 observations, the
probabilities changed by less than 1 percentage point. For 44 observations
the probabilities changed by between 1 and 2 percentage points. For 41
observations the probabilities changed by between 2 and 10 percentage
points; and for only 2 observations did the probabilities change by more
than 10 percentage points.
Taken together these two experiments suggest that the intrinsic
preferences of the parent and child toward share4 living rather than the
relative or absolute incomes of the two are most important in determining
the probability of shared living. In terms of Figure 1, the position of
curve C(A,B) is not highly sensitive to even substantial variations of '5
and'tc around observed values, and the key determinant of the living
arrangement is the location of A and B in the axis. This finding that
income effects play a rather minor role in determining living arrangements
is supported as well by the probit results. Evaluated at the mean levels of
income, which are $36,704 for children and $9719 for parents, the
probability of shared living is .170. If the child's income is reduced from
$36,704 to $12,000, the probability of shared living only increases to .230.—27—
If the child's income is rsised to $65,000 the probability only declines to
.088. Holding the child's income at the mean, if the parent's income is
increased to $20,000, the probability of living together only declines from
.170 to .101; lowering the parent's income to $4000 raises the probability
to only .191.
Section VI. Summary and Conclusion
This paper uses new data on the characteristics of children and parents
to study their decision to live together. Theoretical analysis of this
decision indicates that living arrangements can be studied separately from
the question of child—parent bargaining. The analysis also points out that
income effects with respect to living arrangments are likely to be family—
specific; in some families increases in the incomes of children or parents
will lead them to live apart, in others to live together.
Empirical findings from logit and probit models as well as the
struâtural model suggest that characteristics of children are important
codeterminants of living arrangements. They also support a view that income
differences are not as important as may previously have been thought in
explaining living arrangements.—28—
Table 1 Estimates from Logit Model


































Table 2Estimates from Probit Model

















Table 3Estimates from the Structural Model
Variable Coefficient t—Statjstic










Table 4Probability of Living with Children for Selected Combinations of
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